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Aquinas on Being, by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. 
x and 212. $45.00. 
BRIAN DAVIES, Fordham University 
We say that certain things exist, or that they are beings as opposed to non-
beings. We say, for example, that there are mountains in Switzerland, or 
that people are beings while chimeras are not. But we cannot plausibly 
maintain that "There are mountains in Switzerland," or "John is a being," 
are descriptions of anything. "_ exist(s)" and "_ is a being," do not tell 
us what something is (as some philosophers would say, they are not "first 
level" predicates or predicables). Aquinas, however, seems to hold that 
God is existence or being (esse) itself (ipsum esse subsistens), that this is what 
God is, which might seem to suggest that Aquinas is somewhat askew 
when it comes to the topic of being or existence in general. But is he? In 
The Five Ways (1969) and Aquinas (1980), Kenny argued that he is. In the 
present volume, and with reference to a large range of Aquinas's writings, 
he continues to maintain this verdict. In his discussions of being, says 
Kenny, Aquinas exhibits "extraordinary analytical ability as a philosopher" 
(p.189) and "draws many acute distinctions" (p.viii). And yet, so Kenny 
submits, it is not possible to extract "a consistent and coherent theory" of 
being from Aquinas's many writings. Aquinas's teaching on being is, says 
Kenny, "thoroughly confused" (p.v); though widely admired, it is, in fact, 
"one of the least admirable of his contributions to philosophy" (p.viii). 
Kenny defends these judgments by offering and defending the following 
major conclusions: (1) Aquinas does not grasp the syntactic difference 
between the verb "to be," as expressed by the existential quantifier, and var-
ious other senses of the verb that he highlights; (2) Aquinas's statements 
about spiritual substances (e.g. angels) endorse an unacceptable Platonism 
at odds with Aquinas's usual (Aristotelian) account of form; (3) Aquinas is 
wrong to assert that God is ipsum esse subsistens since, as this teaching is 
articulated in De Ente et Essentia 4,6, and elsewhere, it incorporates (by 
implication) the ludicrous suggestion that the answer to the question "What 
is God?" is "There is one." Kenny also suggests (d. pp.43 f. and 107 ff.) that 
Aquinas's claim that God's essence is existence (esse) (a) entails that the 
word "God" is equivalent to what would be expressed by the ill-formed 
formula "For some x, x ... " (a quantifier with a bound variable attached to 
no predicate), or (b) merely amounts to the assertion that the word "God" 
means "something which cannot cease to exist, and has not begun to exist" 
(d. pp.44 and 85). Kenny adds that Aquinas's teaching that God's essence is 
esse can, from what he writes in the Summa Contra Gentiles (and elsewhere), 
be taken as supposing that "est," in "Deus est," is a genuine first level predi-
cate, which it cannot be, says Kenny, given what we have learned from 
Frege (d. pp.87 and 105 f.). In the context of the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Kenny argues, (d. pp.106 f.), the thesis that God's essence is to exist is to be 
read as asserting (unintelligibly) that God just is (period). 
Kenny is wrong in his reading of De Ente et Essentia 4 and comparable 
passages in Aquinas. In Kenny's translation (p.34), De Ente et Essentia 4 
says: "I can understand what a human being is, or what a phoenix is, and 
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yet be ignorant whether they have esse in the nature of things." As Kenny 
interprets Aquinas, this sentence correctly maintains that knowing what a 
noun means does not amount to knowing that there is anything in reality 
corresponding to it (p.35). But, Kem1Y continues (pp.35 f.), Aquinas wrong-
ly proceeds to conclude that God, therefore, differs from creatures since 
knowing what the word 'God' means is the same as knowing that God 
exists (i.e. that the answer to 'What is God?' is, absurdly, 'There is one'). 
There is, however, no reason to suppose that Aquinas is arguing along the 
lines that Kenny suggests here either in De Ente et Essentia 4 or in other 
comparable passages in his writings. Kenny's reading of Aquinas relies 
heavily on De Ente et Essentia's phoenix example. Given that there is no 
phoenix, Kenny reasons, we must presume Aquinas to be starting only 
from the meaning of certain words (p.35 ff.; d. also p.62 and p.99). Yet we 
have no reason to suppose that, in De Ente et Essentia, Aquinas took 
"phoenix" to signify a purely imaginary object (many of his contempo-
raries certainly did not think of the phoenix in this way, and neither did 
some major early Christian authors - e.g. Tertullian, St Ambrose, and 
Clement of Rome). In the above quotation Aquinas links "phoenix" and 
"human being." In his Commentary on the Sentences (2,3,1,1) he links 
"phoenix" and "eclipse" (d. Aristotle on "eclipse" in Posterior Analytics 
11,2). And, in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo (3,8), he cites the 
phoenix as an example of something generated and perishable, even 
though it is alone in its species. Pace Kenny, therefore, Aquinas's De Ente et 
Essentia argument for there being a distinction of essence and existence in 
creatures, but not in God, is most plausibly read as starting with actually 
existing things (or things actually existing at some times) of which we can 
provide real definitions (not just nominal ones). Aquinas's argument then 
suggests that these definitions do not include "exists" as an element. In De 
Ente et Essentia 4, and in passages comparable to it, Aquinas"s main point 
seems to be that we can understand the natures of (the essences of) various 
real things (all of them created by God) without simultaneously under-
standing that any particular one of them exists. Aquinas thinks that, for 
example, your understanding of the nature which in fact is had by me does 
not entail that there is any such person as me, which seems a plausible 
position to maintain (unless you want to claim that I cannot but exist given 
what I am by nature). 
Kenny might reply that Aquinas still ends up ridiculously asserting or 
implying that "There is one" is the proper answer to "What is God?". But 
there is nothing in Aquinas's writings to support this interpretation of him 
(unless we adopt what I take to be Kenny's misreading of De Ente et 
Essentia 4). In general, Aquinas shows himself perfectly well able to distin-
guish between "Is there ... ?" and "What is ... ?" questions, and between the 
sorts of answers appropriate to each, together with their implications. Of 
course, Aquinas does think that God's essence (essentia) is to exist (esse). But 
he never expounds this doctrine by saying that what God is can be ade-
quately, or even intelligibly, expressed by "There is one." He usually says 
(d. Summa Theologiae la, 3,4) that "God's essence is to exist" means that 
there is no compositio (mixture) in God of essentia and esse, which, in turn, 
means that God cannot owe his existence to anything distinct from himself 
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(i.e. cannot be something created). As Aquinas often stresses, (d. Summa 
Contra Gentiles 1,14, III,39, and the Introduction to Summa Theologiae Ia,3), 
his claim that God's essence is existence is chiefly to be construed as a piece 
of negative theology - as part of an account of what God cannot be, given 
that "we cannot know what God is but only what he is not" (De deo scire 
non possumus quid sit sed quid non sit). Kenny pays no attention to this 
aspect of Aquinas's thinking, which ought to lead his readers to be dubi-
ous when it comes to his claims that "God," for Aquinas, amounts to "For 
some x, x ... ," or that Aquinas's "God's essence is existence" can be con-
strued as teaching that the word "God" only signifies something (maybe 
unreal) which cannot cease to exist and which never began to exist. For 
Aquinas, "God" is the word we can use to refer to what makes the "differ-
ence" between there being something rather than nothing. On Aquinas's 
account, and on the supposition that God has created the universe, "God 
exists" (Deus est) is equivalent (among other things) to the claim that "_ 
creates," "_ is not created," "_ in no sense owes its existence to any-
thing distinct from it" (all, surely, perfectly respectable first level predi-
cates, by the way) are truly affirmable of something. And Aquinas's teach-
ing that God's essence is existence most certainly does not ever amount 
only to the claim that "God" is a word to be understood as meaning 
"Something which cannot cease to exist and never began to exist." 
Of course Aquinas thought that God, by nahue, lacks beginning and 
end. But he thought so because he believed that whatever accounts for 
there being something rather than nothing cannot come into being or per-
ish. And, pace Kenny, he does not take this belief to mean that "God's 
essence is to exist" is equivalent to "God just Is," where "_ is" is to be 
understood as a first level predicate signifying what something is by 
nature. According to Aquinas, we cannot describe something by saying 
that it simply exists. "Every mode of existence," he explains, "is deter-
mined by some form" (quodlibet esse est secundum formam') (d. Summa 
Theologiae la, 5,5 ad.3; d. la, 29,2 ad.5; la, 50,S, la, 75,6; De Principium 
Naturae 1). Like Aristotle, Aquinas believed that there is no such class of 
things as things which just are. For the most part, Aquinas's "Deus est" 
means that what it takes to be divine is truly predicable of something. He 
never explicitly asserts that "est," in "Deus est." tells us what God is. On 
the contrary, he often says that we can know that "Deus est" is true with-
out knowing what God is. For Aquinas, God is not an item in the universe. 
He is not part of what we are concerned with if we ask, as Aquinas thinks 
we should, 'How come something rather than nothing?'. As he puts it in 
his Commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (to which Kenny makes no 
reference), God is extra ordinem entium existens, velut causa quaedam profun-
dens totum ens et omnes eius differentias ("outside the realm of existents, as a 
cause from which pours forth everything that exists in all its variant 
forms"). Aquinas, of course, is not here saying that God does not exist. His 
point is that God cannot be thought of as created, that God is not potential-
ly non-existent. And that is what he is basically saying in the many texts in 
which he contrasts God and creatures by insisting that, while it does not 
belong to creatures to exist by nature, it does so belong to God. Kenny, 
however, while sometimes hovering around it, seems to ignore this aspect 
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of Aquinas's thinking. He never appears seriously to engage with what 
Aquinas chiefly took to be the difference between God and creatures (a dif-
ference which, among other things, leads Aquinas to say that there is a dis-
tinction of essence and existence in creahlres but not in God). 
As for Kenny's criticism of Aquinas concerning spiritual substances, all I 
can say is that it is puzzling. Kenny's idea seems to be that, for Aquinas in 
general (as for Aristotle), a form is what is captured by the predicate in a 
sentence like uFelix is a cat." He writes: "Forms are forms of the entity 
which is the subject of predication: Socrates' wisdom is what corresponds 
to the predicate in the sentence 'Socrates is wise,' and Plato's humanity is 
what corresponds to the predicate in the sentence 'Plato is human.' In the 
same way, a pure form would be something that corresponded to a predi-
cate in a sentence that had no subject; but this seems close to an absurdity. 
What, we wonder, is the difference between the angelic pure forms that 
Aquinas accepts and the Platonic Ideas or Forms that he rejects?" (p.30). 
The difference for Aquinas is, presumably, that angels are subsisting things 
with knowledge and the capacity to act, while Plato's forms are nothing 
like this. It is obvious from so much that he writes that Aquinas would 
give this answer to Kenny. It is equally obvious that Aquinas would say 
that if there is something which subsists immaterially, then it can only be 
thought of as nothing but form. Aquinas, indeed, generally takes "form" to 
be what is flagged by u_ is wise" or "_ is human" in sentences like 
"Socrates is wise" or "Plato is human." And, in doing so, he frequently 
takes "form" to be a word to use when referring to what makes something 
material to be what it is (whether substantially, as in "Plato is human," or 
aCCidentally, as in "Plato is sleeping"). But what shall we say if asked to 
talk about (while presuming the existence of) non-material subsisting sub-
jects such as angels, given that we are seeking to express ourselves with 
reference to the Aristotelian notion of form (as Aquinas, of course, was, 
and as Kenny notes that he was)? We might be forgiven for suggesting 
that such subjects (like God) cannot be material individuals sharing the 
same form, but must, instead, be pure forms: forms existing, though not 
materially. 
One does not, qua Aristotelian, have to believe in angels in order to be 
persuaded that Aquinas is not talking nonsense in what he says about 
them as reported by Kenny. One does not even have to disagree with 
Kenny's suggestion that Aquinas's talk about angels is "arcane" (p.32). All 
one has to do (and Kenny makes precious little effort to do so) is to ask 
what an intelligent Aristotelian might feel obliged to say about angels (a) 
given the general intelligibility of Aristotelian talk about form, and (b) 
given that angels actually exist. Such an Aristotelian would, indeed, be 
trying to go beyond what Aristotle (no believer in angels) actually said 
about anything (including being). But why should fans of Aristotle (or 
anyone else, for that matter) be banned from trying to use words with 
which they are familiar in unfamiliar ways (as Aquinas, with a debt to 
Aristotle, was clearly trying to do in his discussions of angels, not to men-
tion his discussions of God, in which he was also trying to make 
Aristotelians take their thinking further)? 
Aquinas on Being is an important book since it comes from one of the 
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most gifted philosophers writing today, an expert on the history of philos-
ophy, and someone who has been thinking and writing about Aquinas for 
many years. So all serious students of Aquinas should read it and seek to 
engage with its details (on many of which I have not been able to touch in 
this review). My overall impression, however, is that, interesting though 
its discussions of texts of Aquinas are, it has somehow managed to miss 
the forest for the trees, and not to have caught what Aquinas is generally 
driving at in what he has to say about God, being, and existence. Perhaps 
Kenny's basic mistake is to assume that talk about God is easily assimilated 
to talk about creatures. It has been suggested that, in trying to speak of 
God and creatures (which is what, in effect, Aquinas is always trying to 
do), Aquinas was working on the assumption that we can use words, not 
only to say what they mean, but also to point beyond what we understand 
them to mean (d. Herbert McCabe, "The Logic of Mysticism," Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 31, Cambridge, 1992). And, though 
Kenny does not engage with it, there is something to be said for that thesis, 
hard though it may be to do so given the complexities of medieval theories 
of reference (of which Kenny says little) and given corresponding complex-
ities in modem theories of reference (of which Kenny says something). 
Christian Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue, and the Gospel, by 
Rufus Black. Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. 368. $90.00 (Cloth). 
DANIEL N. ROBINSON, Oxford University 
The perennial issue of moral realism is made all the more elusive by the 
protean nature of both the adjective and the noun. As early as Plato's dia-
logues one finds compelling arguments to the effect that all allegedly 
moral discourse is but a veiled reference to personal desires and merely 
conventional values and interests. Throughout the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, moral science was but a part of a general psychology of 
human nature, with special attention to sentiment and the passions. Much 
of the influential writing on the subject was in defense of rationalist or 
emotivist or utilitarian conceptions of morality. 
Within these inspired debates it is seldom easy to extract an ontological-
ly precise version of the "realism" being affirmed or denied. Too often the 
controversy is framed in terms of "objectivity" and "subjectivity," the con-
testants seemingly and comparably confident that the status of realism 
must hang in the balance. It is as if, from the fact that the honeybee'S visual 
sensitivity is greatest in the ultraviolet region of the spectrum, and that 
ours reaches its peak in the region of 5,500 Angstroms, roses can't be real 
after all! It should go without saying, of course, that ontological questions 
regarding the reality of an entity are distinct from epistemological ques-
tions regarding the adequacy or accuracy with which such an entity is 
apprehended. Thus, there may well be real moral properties, but they may 
be beyond our epistemic resources. Or, there may well be real moral prop-
erties, but they may elude all powers of comprehension except those 
